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HIRE DOCTRINE AFFECTS PROFESSORS, GRADUATE 
STUDENTS, AND K-12 TEACHERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
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Work-for-Hire Doctrine Affects Professors, Graduate Students, and K-12 
Teachers in the Information Age, XVIII RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2011), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v18i1/article4.pdf. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] In 1938, the original designers of the Superman comic book figure 
assigned their ownership rights to DC Comics for $130.1  On January 1, 
2013, their heirs plan to reclaim those rights in court.2  The impending 
                                                 
* Attorney, Karr Tuttle Campbell; J.D., University of Washington School of Law; B.A., 
Biochemistry, Columbia University.  The author would like to extend special thanks to 
Clark C. Shores, Gail Dykstra, and Prof. Robert Gomulkiewicz for their inspiration and 
invaluable feedback. 
 
1 See Scott M. Hervey, Superman and a Super Copyright Battle, WEINTRAUB GENSHLEA 
CHEDIAK L. CORP. (Apr. 2, 2008), http://weintraub.com/Publications/Super 
man_and_a_Super_Copyright_Battle.  
 
2 See Nikki Finke, Why Is DC/WB Vendetta Against Superman Copyright Lawyer Relying 
on Stolen Files?, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (June 14, 2011, 4:08 PM), 
http://www.deadline.com/2011/06/attorney-marc-toberoffs-appeal-denied-as-part-of-dc-
comics-warner-bros-suit/.  
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Superman litigation will herald a wave of a new type of action, known as 
copyright termination.  The Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”)3 
granted the original authors of creative works the right to recover rights 
assigned to publishers, media companies, and other parties, after a period 
of thirty-five years.4  Since the Copyright Act became effective on January 
1, 1978,5 the original authors may first assert their termination rights on 
January 1, 2013.   
 
[2] Consider in conjunction a seemingly unrelated issue that has 
simmered for many decades: when a university professor creates a 
copyrightable work such as an article, a book, or a computer program, 
absent any kind of contractual arrangement, does the work belong to the 
professor or to the university?  Despite the widespread belief that the work 
belongs to the professor who creates it,6 the law is far from clear in this 
area.  Copyright law’s “work-for-hire” doctrine states that works made 
during the scope of the creator’s employment belong to his or her 
employer.7  Case law is notoriously unclear on whether works created by a 
professor fall into a “teacher exception” to that doctrine.8  
 
[3] Ownership of faculty-created works remains unclear largely due to 
a dearth of litigation in the area.  Published court opinions on the subject 
                                                                                                                         
 
3 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006). 
 
4 See id. § 203. 
 
5 See id. § 301. 
 
6 See infra p. 6. 
 
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 
8 See infra Parts I-III. 
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are few and far between for two reasons.9  First, universities tend to be 
averse to litigation, especially against their own faculty members.10  They 
are loath to disturb institutional traditions and spark uprisings on their 
campuses and in their communities.  Second, most, if not all, educational 
institutions preempt potential disputes over copyright ownership through 
their faculty policies and employment contracts.11  A modern university’s 
standard practice often includes a copyright section in its intellectual 
property policy that addresses the division of ownership for works created 
by its professors.12   
 
[4] What does the impending Superman litigation have to do with a 
largely academic debate over the ownership rights of universities and their 
employees?  Notably, the Copyright Act does not extend termination 
rights to works made for hire.13  Thus, the Superman action will likely 
encourage a burst in litigation over the boundaries of the work-for-hire 
doctrine.14  In fact, lawsuits seeking declaratory judgments concerning 
                                                 
9 See infra Parts I-III and accompanying notes.  The cases cited in this article represent an 
exhaustive list of all known published court opinions on the academic work-for-hire 
issue. 
 
10 See WENDY S. WHITE, WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU GET A SUBPOENA OR A LEGAL NOTICE 
OR COMPLAINT? 7 (2010). 
 
11 See Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of 
Academic Work in a Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 257 (2004). 
 
12 See Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to 
Faculty Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275, 294-99 (2002) (citing Laura G. Lape, 
Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay Between the 
Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REV. 223 (1992)). 
 
13 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006). 
 
14 See Eric C. Osterberg, Copyright Termination – Watch out for Work for Hire, IP 
LEGAL WATCH (Feb. 8, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://iplawwatch.foxrothschild. 
com/2010/02/articles/copyrights/copyright-termination-watch-out-for-work-for-hire/; 
Larry Rohter, A Village Person Tests the Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2011), 
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artists’ termination rights are already impacting the doctrine.15  This 
litigation is drawing the attention of the software industry and concerning 
some companies that their long-time engineers will attempt to assert 
control over company programming codes.16  In addition, the litigation 
will likely have a major impact on whether teachers will own the 
copyrights to the works they create.   
 
[5] The faculty work-for-hire issue will most likely encourage a 
significant but more gradual increase in litigation in coming years for 
reasons unrelated to termination rights.  In the past, universities have 
refrained from disputing the ownership of faculty-created works in part 
because they rarely expected those works – mostly scholarly articles and 
books – to become commercially marketable.17  However, many 
universities facing budget shortfalls are turning to their technology 
transfer divisions in order to transform intellectual property into a 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/arts/music/village-people-singer-claims-rights-to-
ymca.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the legal battle between Victor Willis and several 
record companies over Willis’ termination rights to songs he helped create while a 
member of the Village People); Larry Rohter, Record Industry Braces for Artists Battles 
over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/08/16/arts/music/springsteen-and-others-soon-eligible-to-recover-song-rights.html 
(describing imminent lawsuits involving musicians’ termination rights and the work-for-
hire doctrine). 
 
15 See, e.g., Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, No. 10 Civ. 141(CM)(KNF), 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 82868 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) (holding that comic book characters such as 
“The Fantastic Four” and “The X-Men” were works made for hire by Marvel Comics). 
 
16 Cf. Justin Hughes, Market Regulation and Innovation: Size Matters (or Should) in 
Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 579-580 (2005) (“In the software industry, it is 
widely accepted that programmers reuse sections of code from prior programs.”).   
 
17 See Scully, supra note 11, at 239. 
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significant source of revenue.18  While most universities have focused 
their efforts on patents, some technology transfer offices look to 
copyrights as well.19  In the words of one commentator, “[t]he ownership 
of academic work, non-patentable work, is now on the table as a 
negotiation item between faculties and their employing universities.”20 
 
[6] Moreover, professors are creating more copyrightable works of 
substantial commercial value.21  Science and engineering departments 
have created much of the computer software powering the Internet 
economy.22  Digital media, such as online content and databases, may 
carry huge commercial value.23  Universities and colleges take particular 
                                                 
18 See Alexander Poltorak, Thar’s Gold in Them Thar Patents: Why It Pays to Protect 
Patent Portfolios, UNIV. BUS. (Oct. 2009), http://www.universitybusiness.com 
/viewarticle.aspx?articleid=1408&p=2.  
 
19 See Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First 
Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2009) (“[I]n contrast with biotechnology, 
where copyright is not available, universities can use software copyright to achieve 
revenue generation goals.”); Scully, supra note 11, at 229, 231, 259.   
 
20 Scully, supra note 11, at 260. 
 
21 See id. at 239 (explaining how this was not the case “before the arrival of digital 
distribution by the Internet ten years ago”). 
 
22 See id. at 257 (chronicling the development of the “information economy,” in which 
“[w]ealth could now be more easily created from the acquisition, manipulation, and 
dissemination of information through computers and the Internet than from the 
manufacture and distribution of tangible goods like razors and race cars”). 
 
23 See Gregor Pryor, Sachin Premnath & Joseph Rosenbaum, Commercial Risks and 
Rewards of the Social Media Phenomenon, INT’L L. OFFICE (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=28190a25-de10-4635-
94a1-2b54f99b06fb. 
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interest in digital course materials such as online lectures.24  Modern 
distance education, a rapidly growing industry, depends on such materials 
and attracts both educational non-profit and for-profit entities.25  Many 
universities have turned to online education to increase their tuition costs 
and revenue relatively cheaply.26  Meanwhile, other institutions have 
begun to distribute digital course materials online at little or no cost.27  
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, now publishes 
all of its course lectures online for free to the general public.28  Apple 
Computer, Inc. has created iTunes U, a free online service that allows 
users to consume educational content on their handheld audio and video 
devices.29  These free services likely will cause friction in the distance 
education industry.   
 
                                                 
24 See Glenda Morgan, Faculty Ownership and Control of Digital Course Materials, 5 
TEACHING WITH TECH. TODAY, no. 4 (Univ. of Wis./ Office of Learning and Info. Tech., 
Madison, Wis.), Jan. 25, 2000, available at http://www.wisconsin.edu/ttt/facown.htm. 
 
25 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE 
EDUCATION 20-23 (1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON COPYRIGHT]; Michael W. Klein, “The 
Equitable Rule”: Copyright Ownership of Distance-Education Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L. 
143, 146-47 (2004). 
 
26 See REPORT ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 25, at 22-24 (“One major benefit of [distance 
education] is that educational institutions have the costs of expensive distance education 
technologies defrayed by their corporate partners . . . and often gain access to the latest 
research of leading academics as reflected in their curriculum.”); Klein, supra note 25, at 
148-49 (providing examples of several universities who are offering distance education 
courses in conjunction with for-profit ventures); Scully, supra note 11, at 231. 
 
27 See Klein, supra note 25, at 149; John Markoff, Virtual and Artificial, but 58,000 Want 
Course, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/ 
science/16stanford.html?pagewanted=print. 
 
28 See Klein, supra note 25, at 149.  
  
29 See Jeffrey Selingo, Is iTunes U for You?, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007, at W22. 
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[7] In fact, disputes over digital course materials have already arisen 
on traditional college campuses.  In 1998, Concord Law School, an online-
only institution, contracted prominent Harvard Law School professor 
Arthur Miller to produce a lecture series on Civil Procedure.30  Harvard 
objected, based on university policy that prohibited faculty from teaching 
at other educational institutions without permission from the 
administration.31  The parties resolved the dispute out of court, but the 
action demonstrated the rising stakes surrounding distance education.32  
Regarding the dispute, Alan Dershowitz, another Harvard Law School 
professor, said, “[w]hat distinguishes the Internet from [other forms of 
distance learning] is the number of zeroes.  The money is so 
overwhelming that it can skew people’s judgment.”33 
 
[8] Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the faculty work-for-hire 
issue is the near-universal assumption by the relevant parties – professors, 
university administrators, and publishers – that professors own the works 
they create.34  For example, during the Harvard-Miller dispute, Harvard 
professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. said, “I’ve been teaching the same course 
                                                 
30 Amy Dockser Marcus, Seeing Crimson: Why Harvard Law Wants to Rein in One of Its 
Star Professors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A1. 
 
31 Id. 
 
32 See id. (illustrating how Arthur Miller’s punishment will amount to no more than 
sanctions issued by the university); see also Klein, supra note 25, at 192 (discussing the 
friction caused by the University’s policy requiring permission from the dean prior to 
serving as a teacher or consultant at an Internet-based institution). 
 
33 Marcus, supra note 30. 
 
34 Cf. Pub. Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 605 (D.D.C. 1959), rev'd 
on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962) (“Many 
scientific articles published in technical journals are written by scientists employed by 
private concerns and their employers generally encourage such activities. No one would 
contend that the copyright on such articles would belong to the employer.”). 
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. . . for 23 years.  I’ve taught at Yale, Cornell and Duke, too, and when I 
moved to a new university nobody said to me I couldn’t take my course 
with me because the university owned it.”35  In fact, the case law is far 
from clear on the subject, and in the past twenty years, many 
commentators have declared the “teacher exception” to the work-for-hire 
doctrine to be dead.36 
 
[9] This article aims to advance discussion about faculty work-for-hire 
in light of a new set of decisions by the courts on the issue over the past 
decade.  Part II chronicles the rise of the teacher exception in the common 
law and its subsequent fall with the Copyright Act of 1976, as well as the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision of Community for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Reid37 (“CCNV”).  Part III analyzes how commentators have reacted 
against the disappearance of the exception and the political and 
sociological underpinnings of those reactions.  Part IV describes how 
some courts have revived, at least in part, the teacher exception in recent 
years.  Part V proposes a scope for the exception consistent with some of 
these recent decisions and balances the binding force of the Copyright Act 
and CCNV against the compelling policies under which courts originally 
established the exception.  The proposal introduces a two-part test: (1) a 
work, to be considered authored by its academic creator, must be scholarly 
in nature; and (2) the creator must have an occupation such that he or she 
has a traditional expectation of ownership.  Under this test, the teacher 
exception would apply: to university faculty, but not to high school 
teachers; to scholarly works, but not course or administrative materials; 
and not only to teaching faculty, but to non-teaching faculty, graduate 
students, and many other academics. 
 
                                                 
35 Marcus, supra note 30. 
 
36 See infra pp. 13-14 and notes 85-86. 
 
37 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND NEAR ABANDONMENT  
OF THE TEACHER EXCEPTION  
 
[10] Historically, the trajectory of the teacher exception has not 
followed a straight line.  The exception emerged in the common law in 
1929 and flourished throughout the middle portion of the Twentieth 
Century.38  However, the codification by the Copyright Act of 1976 of the 
work-for-hire doctrine39 jeopardized the fate of the teacher exception.  The 
1989 Supreme Court decision of Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid defined what the Copyright Act meant by the term “work made for 
hire.”40  Its definition seemed to represent the final nail in the coffin of the 
teacher exception and faculty authorship of creative works. 
 
A. The Rise of the Exception 
 
[11] As a general rule, ownership of creative works belongs to those 
who create them.41  Typically, copyright law designates these people as 
authors.42  However, a work “made for hire” is considered authored by the 
creator’s employer, not the creator.43  Prior to 1976, the common law well 
                                                 
38 See generally Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929) (establishing the 
teacher exception). 
 
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or 
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of 
this title, and unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument 
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”). 
 
40 See generally Reid, 490 U.S. at 737-39, 742-43, 750-51. 
 
41 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 
42 See id. (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or 
authors of the work.”).   
 
43 Id. § 201(b). 
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established this “work-for-hire” doctrine, both in state and federal 
courts.44  The rule acknowledges that employers often invest substantial 
resources to support the creative work of their employees.45  Often an 
employer would not invest such resources, commission the work, or even 
hire the creative employee if the employer did not receive ownership of 
the work.46 
 
[12] In 1929, a District of Columbia court considered a case that 
challenged the work-for-hire doctrine in the educational context.47  
Professor Sherrill, an Army officer and military instructor, had written a 
textbook about military sketching and map reading.48  Prior to publication, 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890) (“If one is employed to 
devise or perfect an instrument, or a means for accomplishing a prescribed result, he 
cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was employed, plead title 
thereto as against his employer.”); Zahler v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 4 Cal. Rptr. 612, 
617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (“Where an employe[sic] creates something as part of his duties 
under his employment, the thing created is the property of his employer . . . .”); Wallace 
v. Helm, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 123 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1969) (“Plaintiff as 
hirer of defendant M And S, is the owner of exclusive property rights . . . of the detailed 
working drawings prepared by said defendant . . . during the course of his 
employment.”); Phillips v. W.G.N., Inc., 307 Ill. App. 1, 10-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940) (“We 
think the great weight of the evidence is that plaintiff was employed by defendants to do 
particular work; was paid for it and in such a situation under the law the ownership in the 
result of what was done belonged to defendants.”). 
 
45 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that such 
“creative work” increases the status of the institution and lures “lucrative research, grants, 
students and faculty”). 
 
46 See Sandip H. Patel, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights in 
Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 496 (1996) (“In addition to their teaching and 
administrative duties, most professors are hired to conduct research within a specified 
discipline that draws on the inputs of other professors, students, and other university 
resources.”). 
 
47 See Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep 286 (D.C. 1929). 
 
48 Id. at 286. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 11 
he printed a pamphlet incorporating a segment of his book.49  The 
defendant, another writer, copied sections of the pamphlet.50  When 
Professor Sherrill sued for copyright infringement, the defendant argued 
that Professor Sherrill did not own the pamphlet’s contents.51   
 
[13] Based on pure policy grounds, with no precedent to support it, the 
Sherrill court held that a professor, not his employer, owns the lectures he 
writes.52  The court focused in part on the difficulty it saw in 
distinguishing spoken lectures from written ones, saying that there was no 
“authority holding that such a professor is obliged to reduce his lectures to 
writing or if he does so that they become the property of the institution 
employing him.”53  The court focused equally on pragmatic 
considerations, observing that “officers do write such books which are 
copyrighted and used in Government schools with the approval of the 
military establishment and such books are found in the libraries of those 
establishments.”54  In essence, the Sherrill court reasoned that institutional 
tradition and regular practice supported the professor’s ownership of his 
lectures.55 
                                                                                                                         
 
49 Id. at 290. 
 
50 Id. at 286, 289-90. 
 
51 See id. at 290 (“The defendants, while claiming that no use was made by [defendant] of 
any part of the Leavenworth Pamphlet, contend . . . [the] pamphlet is a ‘publication of the 
United States Government.’”). 
 
52 See Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. Rep. at 290. 
 
53 Id. 
 
54 Id. 
 
55 Cf. id.  The logical corollary is that holding otherwise would have had widespread and 
severe downstream effects on third parties such as military libraries and their readers. 
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[14] It took forty years for another published opinion on faculty work-
for-hire to arise.56  In Williams v. Weisser, the California Court of Appeals 
encountered a college note-taking company that hired students at the 
University of California Los Angeles to attend classes and take lecture 
notes, which the company then published.57  The plaintiff, an 
anthropology professor, sued the company for copyright infringement.58  
As in Sherrill, the defendant argued the professor did not own his 
lectures.59  Citing Sherrill, the court held that a professor owns the 
common law copyright to his own lectures.60   
 
[15] The Williams court drew from some of the same policies as 
Sherrill, reasoning that a university should not “prescribe [a professor’s] 
way of expressing the ideas he puts before his students.”61  More notably, 
however, the court invoked the concepts of academic freedom and 
movement, stating, “[p]rofessors are a peripatetic lot, moving from 
campus to campus.  The courses they teach begin to take shape at one 
institution and are developed and embellished at another.”62  The court 
explicitly established what subsequently became known as the teacher 
                                                 
56 See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
 
57 See id. at 543.  
 
58 See id. 
 
59 See id. (“On appeal defendant [argued] . . . [t]he common law copyright in plaintiff’s 
lectures presumptively belonged to UCLA.”). 
 
60 See id. at 549 (“There is therefore no real difference between Sherrill and plaintiff.  
Neither was under a duty to make notes, neither was under a duty to prepare for his 
lectures during any fixed hours, but the notes that each made did directly relate to the 
subjects taught.”). 
 
61 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546. 
 
62 Id. 
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exception: “University lectures are sui generis.  Absent compulsion by 
statute or precedent, they should not be blindly thrown into the same legal 
hopper with valve designs” or other creative works that had previously 
been held to fall under the work-for-hire doctrine.63 
 
[16] In light of the sparse case law in the area of faculty work-for-hire, 
the California Court of Appeals’ decision became the established common 
law for all intents and purposes.64  No court prior to the passage of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 ever extended the work-for-hire doctrine to 
professors or other academics.65  In the 1970s, commentators, most 
notably Professor Melville Nimmer, came to use the term “teacher 
exception” to describe the rule established by Sherrill and Williams, 
arguably implying that it would extend to all types of works by all 
teachers, including K-12 educators.66  Few considered that the policy 
bases on which Sherrill and Williams rested might not apply to some types 
of works, or apply in the K-12 classroom.67 
                                                 
63 Id. at 547 (providing a list of various other works that were held as “works-for-hire” by 
courts across the country). 
 
64 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
5.03[B][1][b][i] & n.94 (David Nimmer ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2011), available at 
LexisNexis Nimmer (tracing the history of court rulings on the teacher exception leading 
up to the 1976 Act). 
 
65 See id.; see also Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (“This 
has been the academic tradition since copyright law began . . . .”). 
 
66 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 64, § 5.03[B][1][b][i] (using “teacher exception” 
for the first time in Nimmer’s 1978 edition); Pamela A. Kilby, The Discouragement of 
Learning: Scholarship Made for Hire, 21 J.C. & U.L. 455, 458-59 (1995); Elizabeth 
Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing “Teacher Exception,” or 
Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century University, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209, 
211 (2003). 
 
67 But see Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational Process: The Right of Teacher 
Inception, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 381, 396 (1990) (“Should the Williams conclusion be equally 
applicable to the not so peripatetic high school and grade school teachers?”). 
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B. The Copyright Act of 1976, CCNV, and the Apparent Collapse 
of the Exception 
 
[17] Ironically, Williams’ qualification of the teacher exception “absent 
compulsion by statute or precedent”68 foreshadowed the events of the next 
twenty-five years.  In 1976, Congress passed its landmark re-write of the 
copyright rules, effectively harmonizing them around the country by 
removing the last vestiges of common law.69  One of the 1976 Act’s many 
changes was to codify the work-for-hire doctrine.70  The new law states in 
part: “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the 
parties have expressly agreed otherwise . . . owns all of the rights 
comprised in the copyright.”71  The Act defines a “work made for hire” as 
one “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment.”72  The Act does not define the terms “employee” or “scope 
of one’s employment.”73  The legislative history also provides no clue as 
to how Congress intended the provision to apply to teachers and other 
academics.74 
                                                                                                                         
 
68 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 547. 
 
69 See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006) (originally enacted as of 
Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541). 
 
70 Id. § 201(b). 
 
71 Id. 
 
72 Id. § 101. 
 
73 See id. (leaving the terms “employment” and “scope of employment” out of the 
definitions section). 
 
74 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5736-37 (discussing the laborious task of adequately defining 
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[18] Because Williams had so clearly created a special exception for 
teachers, or at least for professors, and because the Copyright Act codified 
the work-for-hire doctrine without reference to any exception for teachers, 
“the conclusion that the Act abolished the exception may seem 
inescapable.”75  Still, at least one avenue remained for faculty ownership: 
academic works might fall outside of the scope of a professor’s 
employment and might thereby escape the work-for-hire doctrine 
altogether. 
 
[19] The Supreme Court defined the term “employee” under the 
Copyright Act in 1989 with the landmark case of Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid.76  In that case, the creator was not a teacher, but an 
artist.77  A non-profit organization contracted with James Reid, a sculptor, 
to produce a statue “dramatiz[ing] the plight of the homeless.”78  After Mr. 
Reid finished his work, communication faltered, and CCNV eventually 
filed an infringement action for ownership of the statue.79  The Supreme 
Court decided Mr. Reid was not an employee of the non-profit 
organization; therefore,  CCNV was not entitled to the statue under the 
                                                                                                                         
“works made for hire” in the Act); see also Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 
416 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Until 1976, the statutory term ‘work made for hire’ was not 
defined”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 859, 888-890 (1987) (arguing the 1976 Act’s “pre-legislative 
dialogue” indicates the term “employee” was meant to apply only to a “statutory worker 
in a long-term position”). 
 
75 Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.  
 
76 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 732 (1989). 
 
77 Id. 
 
78 Id. at 733. 
 
79 See id. at 735. 
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work-for-hire doctrine.80  More importantly for future cases, the Court 
held that in determining whether a work is a work made for hire under the 
Copyright Act, courts should apply the principles of the common law of 
agency.81  It reasoned that: 
 
In the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ 
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress 
intended to describe the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common-law agency 
doctrine. . . .  Nothing in the text of the work for hire 
provisions indicates that Congress used the words 
‘employee’ and ‘employment’ to describe anything other 
than [that relationship].82 
 
[20] Since the Court held that Reid was not an employee of the 
organization,83 it did not examine the “scope of employment” issue.  It 
nevertheless recognized that “scope of employment” was a “widely used 
term of art in agency law,”84 and lower courts have universally interpreted 
CCNV to require the superimposition of the common law of agency on 
“scope of employment” analyses.85  Section 228 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, representing the common law of the time regarding 
whether some work is within the scope of employment, indicated courts 
could consider whether “(a) [the work] is of the kind [the employee] is 
                                                 
80 See id. at 752-53. 
 
81 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40. 
 
82 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
83 See id. at 752. 
 
84 Id. at 740. 
 
85 See, e.g., Price v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time 
and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the master . . . .”86  Lower courts have continued to apply this test, 
despite the fact that since 1989 both the common law and the Restatement 
have shifted significantly toward finding more activity to fall within the 
scope of employment.87  While neither CCNV nor its lower-court progeny 
addressed the teacher exception, the message was clear: the courts 
intended to settle the meanings of the Copyright Act’s references to 
“employee” and “scope of employment” in its work-for-hire provision.  
The rules established in those cases applied to traditional master-servant 
relationships and to non-traditional, unsupervised contractual relationships 
alike.  It seemed that there was no exception for teachers or others on the 
university campus. 
 
III.   REACTIONS TO THE APPARENT DEATH OF  
THE TEACHER EXCEPTION 
 
[21] Since the late 1980s, commentators have declared the teacher 
exception to be effectively dead, relegated to the dustbin of jurisprudential 
history by the Copyright Act and CCNV.88  Courts and commentators alike 
have lamented its disappearance, and some have called for its revival.89  
This section examines some of the reactions of those courts and 
commentators and summarizes their main arguments.  Part IV will 
                                                 
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). 
 
87 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (2006).  The impact of this common-
law shift on the work-for-hire doctrine is unclear, and has not been discussed by any 
courts or commentators.  It is beyond the scope of this article. 
 
88 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 25, at 168-69; Packard, supra note 12, at 314; Townsend, 
supra note 66, at 243, 245. 
 
89 See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988); Packard, 
supra note 12, at 314; Townsend, supra note 66, at 282-83. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 18 
demonstrate how later courts invoked these arguments to resuscitate the 
teacher exception, at least partially.  Part V will evaluate some of these 
arguments in order to design a practicable test to design a reasonable 
scope for the revived exception. 
 
A. Weinstein and Hays: The Exception on Life Support 
 
[22] The Seventh Circuit decided two landmark teacher work-for-hire 
cases in the late 1980s,90 shortly before CCNV.  Those cases, Weinstein v. 
University of Illinois and Hays v. Sony Corporation of America, 
recognized the threat that the Copyright Act posed to the teacher 
exception, yet both managed to avert direct confrontation, each in its own 
way.91  Remarkably, these cases represent two very different approaches 
to the post-1976 (and post-CCNV) teacher exception dilemma. 
 
[23] The first case, Weinstein, involved a “private war”92 among 
university faculty members at the University of Illinois over the order of 
authorship on a scholarly article published by the American Journal of 
Pharmaceutical Education.93  Professor Weinstein sued the university and 
the other faculty members, claiming that they had deprived him of his due 
process rights.94  The defendants responded in part by arguing that 
Weinstein lacked a property interest in the article.95  The university had a 
                                                 
90 See Hays, 847 F.2d at 417; Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
 
91 Hays, 847 F.2d 412; Weinstein, 811 F.2d 1091. 
 
92 Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1092. 
 
93 See id. 
 
94 See id. 
 
95 See id. at 1095. 
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written policy incorporated into Weinstein’s employment contract that 
defined “work for hire” for purposes of its employees; yet it was not clear 
under that policy who actually owned the article, the professor or the 
university.96 
 
[24] In an opinion penned by Judge Easterbrook and joined by Judge 
Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that the policy granted ownership of the 
article to Professor Weinstein.97  In doing so, it first acknowledged that the 
Copyright Act “is general enough to make every academic article a ‘work 
for hire’ and therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than 
scholars.”98  It then examined the university’s policy only cursorily, and 
concluded that the policy “reads more naturally when applied to 
administrative duties,” despite no reference to administrative duties in the 
policy.99  The court relied almost exclusively on its recognition of an 
“academic tradition” that existed “since copyright law began.”100  It noted 
a concession by the university that “a professor of mathematics who 
proves a new theorem in the course of his employment will own the 
copyright to his article containing that proof,”101 and claimed, “[w]e 
                                                 
96 See id. at 1094. 
 
97 See Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094-95.  The Weinstein court decided the ownership of the 
article under the university’s faculty employment contract, but not the article’s 
authorship.  Id.  Assuming that the professor assigned the article to the American Journal 
of Pharmaceutical Education, the decision does not bear directly on who would be able to 
assert termination rights to the article 35 years after its creation in 1985.  See id. at 1092.  
Thus, if the article was in fact a work made for hire, then ownership might revert to the 
university in 2020 rather than to Professor Weinstein. 
 
98 Id. at 1094. 
 
99 Id. 
 
100 Id. (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 64,§ 5.03[B][1][b]). 
 
101 Id.  
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would be surprised if any member of the faculty of the College of 
Pharmacy treats his academic work as the property of the University.”102  
Thus, Weinstein represents two arguments central to the faculty work-for-
hire debate: first, that an “academic tradition” weighs heavily in favor of 
recognizing the teacher exception; and second, that the teacher exception 
did not work so much as a legal rule in the absence of contract, but as a 
canon for interpreting employment contracts and university policies. 
 
[25] Hays, the second of the Seventh Circuit’s cases on faculty work-
for-hire, did not involve an employment contract including a copyright 
provision upon which the court could fall back.103  Remarkably, Judge 
Posner wrote the Hays opinion and was joined by Judge Easterbrook.104  
Two high school teachers had prepared an instructional manual on how to 
operate the school’s Sony word processors, and had distributed the manual 
to students and colleagues.105  Their employment contracts made no 
mention of copyrightable works.106  Two years later, the teachers 
discovered that Sony had published a manual very similar to theirs, “in 
many places a verbatim copy,” and sued for copyright infringement.107  
Sony defended in part by arguing that the teachers did not own the manual 
they wrote.108  The trial court dismissed the complaint, calling its claims 
                                                 
102 Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094. 
 
103 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The plaintiffs’ 
employment contracts with the school district contain no reference to copyright . . . .”).  
 
104 Id. at 413. 
 
105 See id. 
 
106 Id. at 417. 
 
107 Id. at 413. 
 
108 See Hays, 847 F.2d. at 415. 
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and requests for relief frivolous, and awarded Rule 11 sanctions to 
Sony.109 
 
[26] The Seventh Circuit did not rule on dismissal itself, since the 
plaintiffs had failed to perfect their appeal on that issue.110  However, 
Judge Posner, a university professor himself, seemed to go out of his way 
to declare his support of the teacher exception.  In doing so, he relied on 
pure policy grounds, arguing that “the universal assumption and practice 
[prior to 1976] was that . . . the right to copyright such writing belonged to 
the teacher rather than to the college or university,”111 and that “[t]he 
reasons for a presumption against finding academic writings to be work 
made for hire are as forceful today as they ever were.”112  Judge Posner 
went well beyond the reasoning of Weinstein, observing that “[a] college 
or university does not supervise its faculty in the preparation of academic 
books and articles, and is poorly equipped to exploit their writings . . . 
.”113  He continued: 
 
To a literalist of statutory interpretation, the conclusion that 
the Act abolished the exception may seem inescapable. . . . 
But considering the havoc that such a conclusion would 
wreak in the settled practices of academic institutions, the 
lack of fit between the policy of the work-for-hire doctrine 
and the conditions of academic production, and the absence 
of any indication that Congress meant to abolish the teacher 
exception, we might, if forced to decide the issue, conclude 
                                                 
109 See id. at  413. 
 
110 See id. at 417. 
 
111 Id. at 416. 
 
112 Id. 
 
113 Hays, 847 F.2d at 416. 
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that the exception had survived the enactment of the 1976 
Act.114 
 
[27] Hays stands for three principles in support of the teacher 
exception.  First, as noted in Weinstein, there is a widespread assumption 
among professors and universities alike, based on academic tradition, that 
professors own the scholarly works they create.115  Second, disturbance of 
that academic tradition would “wreak havoc” on settled practices.116  
Finally, the absence of a teacher exception would be incongruent with “the 
conditions of academic production,” which foster scholarship in the 
university context.117  In effect, Judge Posner defended what he saw as an 
attack on the principle of academic freedom. 
 
[28] Perhaps most remarkably, Hays concerns high school teachers,118 
not university professors, so these principles had little relevance to the 
facts of the case.  Judge Posner seemed to acknowledge this by reasoning 
that, even if the teacher exception no longer existed, the word processor 
manual may have escaped the work-for-hire doctrine because, “[u]nlike 
college and university teachers, high-school teachers normally are not 
expected to do writing as part of their employment duties.”119  However, 
the court did not address the possibility that the teacher exception did not, 
or should not, extend from the college campus to the high school 
classroom. 
                                                 
114 Id. at 416-17. 
 
115 See id. at 416. 
 
116 See id.  
 
117 See id. 
 
118  Hays, 847 F.2d at 413. 
 
119 Id. at 417. 
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B. Commentators’ Reactions 
 
[29] In Hays, Judge Posner noted, “it is widely believed that the 1976 
Act abolished the teacher exception.”120  Indeed, observers during the 
1978-1989 period declared the exception either dead or knocking on 
death’s door.121  If the Copyright Act provided the teacher exception’s 
coffin, then CCNV provided the nails.  By holding that the common law of 
agency should manage the contours of the work-for-hire doctrine, 
regardless of whether a traditional employee or an artist (or, presumably, a 
professor or a high school teacher) created the copyrighted work, the 
Supreme Court seemed to leave little room for an exception based on a 
seldom-cited common-law copyright theory.  Since 1989, some 
commentators have declared the teacher exception gone for good.122  
Others have argued it survives, not as a formal exception to the work-for-
hire doctrine, but as a Weinstein-like canon for the interpretation of 
employment contracts or agency law.123  Still others have argued that the 
exception lives on in true form, yet with little support from the courts 
                                                 
120 Id. at 416. 
 
121 See, e.g., Leonard D. Duboff, An Academic’s Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 17, 24-25 (1984) (“This 1976 Copyright Act fails to support 
this traditional relationship between the academician and the institution in which he 
works.”); Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They “Works Made for Hire” Under the 
1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485, 486 (1982) (“[S]tate common law copyright is 
pre-empted by federal copyright for most purposes [under § 301], undermining the 
precedential value of the handful of common law cases on point which might be utilized 
to excuse faculty from the work ‘made for hire’ provision of the 1976 Act.”). 
 
122 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 25, at 144; Packard, supra note 12, at 314. 
 
123 See, e.g., Kilby, supra note 66, at 459; James B. Wadley & JoLynn M. Brown, 
Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights, Work-for-Hire and a New 
Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 427-28 (1999). 
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beyond Hays’ dicta to support them.124  As explained in Part III, however, 
the teacher exception has survived, and multiple court opinions have cited 
the exception approvingly.   
 
IV.  THE TEACHER EXCEPTION’S SURVIVAL INTO THE  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
 
[30] After a period of near-silence by the courts on academic work-for-
hire problems during the 1990s, the teacher exception has apparently 
lurched back from death in the 21st Century.  No court has ever explicitly 
rejected it.  Moreover, recent published federal decisions have accepted its 
continuing existence.125  One such court, Bosch v. Ball-Kell, cites the 
exception explicitly to award authorship of copyrighted works to a 
university professor.126  Considering the historical dearth of published 
court opinions on academic work-for-hire issues, one could say that the 
teacher exception is alive and kicking.  This Part examines the case law 
that has revived the exception, and looks at courts’ attempts to delineate 
its scope. 
 
 
                                                 
124 See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University Campus: The First 
Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 291, 
304 (2000); Townsend, supra note 66, at 245-46. 
 
125 See, e.g., Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1719-20 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
 
126 See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716-1722.  The decision in Bosch only denied 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether Bosch owned the 
teaching materials in question.  See id. at 1721.  However, in the subsequent jury trial, the 
jury determined Bosch to be the owner of two of three sets of teaching materials.  Bosch 
v. Ball-Kell, No. 03-1408, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63785, at *1-2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 
2007).  The defendant’s Rule 50 Motion to Direct Entry of Judgment as a Matter of Law 
was subsequently denied.  Id. at *1, *3. 
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A. Recognition of the Exception by Some Courts 
 
[31] The Second Circuit was the first court to recognize the continuing 
viability of the teacher exception, albeit implicitly.127  In Shaul v. Cherry 
Valley-Springfield Central School District, decided in 2004, a public 
school district suspended William Shaul, a high school mathematics 
teacher, in connection with allegations that he had harassed and engaged 
in improper relations with several female students.128  Following his 
suspension, school officials took teaching materials from his office, at one 
point drilling out the lock of one of his filing cabinets.129  The materials 
included “tests, quizzes, and homework problems.”130  No school policy 
addressed the ownership of such works.131  Shaul then sued the school 
district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he had a property interest in 
the materials and that their seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.132 
 
[32] Adhering to CCNV and common-law agency principles, the 
Second Circuit held that the high school owned the teaching materials that 
Shaul had created.133  However, the court made the following response to 
Shaul’s argument that he owned the materials under the teacher exception: 
 
The plaintiff . . . seeks to invoke an “academic” exception 
to the work-for-hire doctrine.  See Weinstein v. University 
                                                 
127 See generally Shaul, 363 F.3d 177. 
 
128 See id. at 180. 
 
129 See id. at 181. 
 
130 Id. 
 
131 See id. at 186. 
 
132 See Shaul, 363 F.3d at 181. 
 
133 See id. at 185-86. 
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of Illinois, 811 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1987).  However, unlike 
the university employer in Weinstein, the School District in 
the instant case does not have a formal and written policy 
concerning work produced by teachers.  Furthermore, the 
“academic tradition” granting authors ownership of their 
own scholarly work is not pertinent to teaching materials 
that were never explicitly prepared for publication by 
Shaul, as opposed to published articles by university 
professors.134  
 
Thus, while the court did not endorse the teacher exception, neither did the 
court reject it in its entirety.  Most interestingly, by distinguishing teaching 
materials created by high school teachers from published articles created 
by university professors,135 it implicitly proposed a narrowing of the 
exception’s scope, if it existed at all.  It rested its distinction on the 
contours of academic tradition, the principle on which Weinstein and Hays 
were based.136   
 
[33] A year later, in Pavlica v. Behr, the Southern District of New York 
encountered another dispute in which a high school teacher claimed 
ownership of a work he created.137  In that case, Robert Pavlica, a science 
teacher, wrote a manual explaining a method of teaching independent 
                                                 
134 Id. at 186 (citation omitted). 
 
135 See id. 
 
136 See id. (“However, unlike the university employer in Weinstein, the School District in 
the instant case does not have a formal and written policy concerning work produced by 
teachers.”)  Ironically, however, by declining to extend the exception to the high school 
context or to unpublished teaching materials, the Second Circuit contradicted two of the 
most often-cited teacher exception precedents, Hays (high school teachers) and Weisser 
(unpublished teaching materials).  See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 
1988); Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).   
 
137 See Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519 (2005). 
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science research to high school students.138  He created the manual at his 
home, on his own time and without any involvement or direction by the 
school.139  He then worked with two colleagues, under a grant from the 
National Science Foundation (“NSF”), to distribute the manual in a series 
of workshops outside of school.140  He later sued those colleagues, 
alleging that they had copied and distributed the manual without his 
permission.141  As in many other work-for-hire disputes, the defendants 
moved for summary judgment on the basis that Pavlica did not own the 
copyright to the manual.142 
 
[34] The court denied the defendants’ motion finding sufficient 
evidence to show that Pavlica, and not his school, owned the copyright to 
the manual that he wrote.143  While it did not rest its conclusion on the 
teacher exception, similar to Hays, Pavlica “‘prepared the manual on [his] 
own initiative without direction or supervision by [his] superiors.’”144  The 
court distinguished the situation from Shaul, concluding that a reasonable 
jury could find that “Pavlica designed an entirely new course without 
assistance of or direction by his employer.”145   
                                                 
138 See id. at 522. 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 See id. at 523. 
 
141 See id. at 523-24. 
 
142 See Pavlica, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 
143 See id. at 525-26.  Finding that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should not 
be granted because a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question of ownership, 
the court noted that “[i]ndeed, even Byram Hills maintains that Pavlica owns the 
copyright to the manual and pays him the standard fee for use of the manual in its science 
research program.”  Id. at 525. 
 
144 Id. at 526 (quoting Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 
145 Id. at 525. 
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[35] The Pavlica opinion is significant to the teacher exception 
equation because it demonstrates that, even were courts do limit the 
teacher exception to the university setting, as Shaul did, K-12 teachers 
would retain ownership of many of the works they create.  To do so they 
would simply have to prove that they created those works outside of the 
scope of their employment.  Because K-12 teachers’ duties to their schools 
are usually clearer than professors’ duties to their universities, it is easier 
for them to demonstrate they had no duty to create the work in question.  
Therefore, the court easily found the drafting of the manual fell outside of 
the scope of Pavlica’s employment.  However, if a university professor 
had accepted the same NSF grant to write and distribute the very same 
manual, then the scope-of-employment analysis may have proven more 
difficult, and the court very well might have gone the opposite way. 
 
[36] While Shaul and Pavlica cracked the door for the teacher 
exception, Bosch v. Ball-Kell slammed it wide open.146  Bosch, decided by 
Judge Mihm of the Central District of Illinois in 2006, involved a dispute 
in the pathology department at the University of Illinois College of 
Medicine in Peoria (“UICOM”).147  The plaintiff, professor and course 
director Barbara Bosch, resigned from her position following a 
particularly vicious feud with two other members of the faculty, Susan 
Ball-Kell and Donald Rager.148  Five days after Bosch’s resignation as 
course director, Ball-Kell entered Bosch’s office and took copies of her 
course materials, including lectures, exam questions, and laboratory 
protocols.149  When Ball-Kell copied and used those materials to teach her 
                                                                                                                         
 
146 See generally Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
 
147 Id. at 1715. 
 
148 See id. at 1715–16. 
 
149 Id. 
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own classes, Bosch sued for copyright infringement.150  The defendants 
argued that the materials were “works made for hire” owned by 
UICOM.151 
 
[37] The court held that it was Professor Bosch, rather than UICOM, 
who owned the course materials.152  It explicitly rested its conclusion 
largely on the “logic” of the Weinstein and Hays pronouncements in 
support of the teacher exception.153  It elaborated on what Hays called “the 
lack of fit between the policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the 
conditions of academic production . . . .”154  The court continued: 
 
In the typical work for hire scenario, the employer assigns 
and directs the topic, content, and purpose of the work.  In 
the academic setting, an employee may be assigned to teach 
a particular course, but then is generally left to use his or 
her discretion to determine the focus of the topic, the way 
the topic is going to be approached, the direction of the 
inquiry, and the way the material will ultimately be 
presented.155 
 
[38] Interestingly, the defendants argued not that Weinstein and Hays 
were unpersuasive, or that the Supreme Court’s subsequent CCNV 
                                                 
150 See id. at 1716–17. 
 
151 Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006)). 
 
152 See id. 
 
153 See id. at 1719-21; see also supra note 126 (providing background information on the 
subsequent jury trial in this case). 
 
154 Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719-20 (quoting Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 
F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 
155 Id. at 1720. 
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decision overruled them, but that they applied solely to “faculty 
publications for scholarly review or self-promotion,” and not to course 
materials.156  However, the court countered by pointing to the university’s 
intellectual property policy.157  Within the category of “traditional 
academic copyrightable works,” the policy itself listed only “class notes 
[and] educational software”;158 yet, citing Weinstein, the court considered 
evidence offered by Bosch of deliberations in the faculty senate regarding 
UICOM’s intellectual property policy.159  That evidence demonstrated a 
“legislative intent, so to speak,” that the policy considered “course 
materials, such as syllabi, notes, etc.” to be “traditional academic 
copyrightable works,” owned by their faculty creators rather than by the 
university.160  The court also pointed to further deliberations by a faculty 
senate committee that demonstrated “the general practice and 
understanding, by both faculty and apparently also by University counsel, 
that teaching materials fell within the [university policy's] general rule of 
traditional academic works for which ownership would be vested in the 
author of the materials.”161 
 
[39] What is perhaps most ironic about this line of reasoning is the 
court had no explanation of why the deliberative history of the university’s 
policy, as opposed to the policy’s text, should have had any bearing on the 
court’s decision.  Under the Copyright Act, the employer owns a work 
made for hire “unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a 
                                                 
156 Id. at 1720. 
 
157 See id.  
 
158 Id.  
 
159 See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
 
160 Id. 
 
161 Id. at 1721. 
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written instrument signed by them.”162  The Weinstein court examined the 
text of the University of Illinois’s intellectual property policy because 
Professor Weinstein’s employment contract incorporated it explicitly;163 
the Bosch court made no similar connection between Professor Bosch’s 
contract and the UICOM policy.164  Moreover, the court made no 
indication that she was present during any of the committee meeting 
deliberations cited by the court.165  In fact, one of the deliberations the 
court cited took place after Ball-Kell had taken the materials from Bosch’s 
office.166  In summary, it is unlikely that Bosch had any privity with 
respect to the senate deliberations; therefore, they should have bound 
neither her nor UICOM.167 
 
[40] Bosch is also notable because it highlights the potential for 
universities and their administrators to copy or distribute works even when 
those works fall under the teacher exception and are owned by their 
faculty members.  After the court found sufficient evidence that Professor 
Bosch owned the copyright to her teaching materials to survive summary 
judgment, it then proceeded to analyze whether the university could be 
                                                 
162 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
 
163 See Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 
164 See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (noting that Bosch sought confirmation of 
the policy from the University Intellectual Property Office). 
 
165 See id. at 1720.  The court considered evidence presented by Bosch of a University 
senate committee deliberation as shown in meeting minutes, and formal findings stated in 
a committee report to the University president regarding her complaint.  See id. 
 
166 Id. at 1716, 1720 (illustrating how Ball-Kell took the teaching materials on August 7, 
2002, and the faculty senate committee report was dated April 12, 2003).  
 
167 See Wadley & Brown, supra note 123, at 423 (“It is unlikely that [many university IP] 
policies can satisfy the requirements of the writing envisioned by section 201(b) because 
they are typically not signed by the parties and do not expressly reverse the presumption 
of the [work-for-hire] doctrine.”). 
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shielded from liability by the fair use doctrine.168  Therefore, the court 
refused to grant the university’s motion for summary judgment on that 
basis.169  A jury later found that UICOM’s reproduction of two works 
owned by Bosch was considered fair use and “did not infringe on Bosch’s 
copyrights.”170  Fair use may well protect universities and university 
administrators in many other contexts in which they would otherwise be 
infringing.  It is important to note, however, that other defendants in 
faculty work-for-hire disputes, such as between faculty author and 
publishers arguing professors, do not have standing to assert termination 
rights, and would not be able to use this defense. 
 
B. Omission (but Not Rejection) of the Exception by Other Courts 
 
[41] While the preceding cases show judicial recognition of faculty 
ownership, either outright or via the teacher exception, other courts in 
recent years granted ownership of faculty-created works to the employer 
without any reference to the exception.171   
 
[42] University of Colorado Foundation v. American Cyanamid was a 
faculty work-for-hire dispute between a private vitamin manufacturer and 
                                                 
168 See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721-23. 
 
169 Id. at 1723. 
 
170 See Bosch v. Ball-Kell, No. 03-1408, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63785, *2-3 (C.D. Ill. 
Aug. 29, 2007) (discussing the reasons why the jury found the University’s use of the 
teaching materials constituted fair use); see also Jeff Galin, Bosch v. Ball-Kell: Faculty 
May Have Lost Control over Their Teaching Materials, NAT’L COUNCIL OF TCHRS. OF 
ENG. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.ncte.org/cccc/committees/ip/2007developments/ 
boschvballkell. 
 
171 See e.g., Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (D. Colo. 
1998); Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid, 880 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Colo. 1995), 
rev’d on other grounds, 902 F. Supp. 221 (D. Colo. 1995); Rouse v. Walter & Assocs., 
513 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Iowa 2007). 
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a university.172  The manufacturer paid university faculty members to 
devise and study a reformulated prenatal vitamin.173  The faculty 
submitted the research results for publication in professional journals and 
supplied the manufacturer with a courtesy copy of the submission.174  
Using the contents of that article and the university’s research, the 
manufacturer procured a patent for the reformulated vitamin, prompting 
the university to file suit.175  The defense argued that actual ownership of 
the research product and article was unclear, but offered no evidence to 
support this position.176  The court concluded that the university owned 
the work, with no need to address in detail agency principles or the teacher 
exception.177 
 
[43] Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District was an 
employment termination dispute in which the plaintiff, a veterinary 
professor and clinician, brought a copyright infringement claim against his 
                                                 
172 See Cyanamid, 880 F. Supp. at 1389. 
 
173 See id. at 1390. 
 
174 Id. at 1391 (noting the New England Journal of Medicine’s rejection to publish the 
study in 1981, which was later accepted and published in the March 1983 volume of 
“Obstetrics and Gynecology”). 
 
175 See id. at 1392.  Notably, this case did not involve an authorship dispute between the 
university and its faculty, as patent ownership in faculty research was contractually 
assigned to the university pursuant to its policies.  See id. at 1391.  The faculty members 
did however join the university as plaintiffs in the litigation, which collectively alleged: 
conversion, fraud, wrongful naming of patent inventor, copyright and patent 
infringement, breach of confidentiality, and unjust enrichment.  Id. at 1389.  
 
176 See id. at 1400 (“Cyanamid offers no evidence which places in issue the original 
authorship of the Article by [the faculty members], nor the [university’s] entitlement to 
ownership of the copyright as their employer.”). 
 
177 See Cyanamid, 880 F. Supp. at 1400-03 (assessing each element of the plaintiffs’ 
copyright infringement claim). 
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former employer for allegedly infringing use of a “Veterinary Technology 
Outline” that he developed “in the course of teaching . . . .”178  The court 
followed CCNV and agency principles and relied heavily upon the 
employer’s stated policy, which defined a faculty member’s duties to 
include “professional service activities [including], but not limited to, 
course, program and curriculum development [and] course 
preparations.’”179  The court made no mention of the teacher exception 
and granted summary judgment to the employer as “there [was] no 
genuine dispute that Vanderhurst’s creation of the Outline was connected 
directly with the work for which [he] was employed … and was fairly and 
reasonably incidental to his employment.”180 
 
[44] In Rouse v. Walter & Associates, agricultural research professors at 
Iowa State University (“ISU”) sued an external consultant for alleged 
infringement of cattle-imaging software the faculty members had created 
together.181  The consultant argued that ISU owned the copyright to 
software code used to develop new technology and the code was created 
during the course of research as a work for hire, therefore, the plaintiffs 
did not own the software.182  Adhering closely to CCNV and its non-
academic progeny, the court overlooked any possible teacher exception in 
its thorough analysis of agency principles, holding that ISU owned the 
copyright to the software code.183  In particular, the court emphasized the 
                                                 
178 See Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1298, 1307 (D. 
Colo. 1998). 
 
179 Id. at 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
180 Id. 
 
181 See Rouse v. Walker & Assocs., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045-50 (S.D. Iowa 2007). 
 
182 See id. at 1053 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006)) (“Only ‘[t]he legal or beneficial 
owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled … to institute an action for any 
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.’”). 
 
183 See id. at 1055-61. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 35 
fact that the professors “were employed as faculty members of ISU” and 
dedicated their careers to developing the type of technology at issue.184  
The court also brushed aside evidence that the professors did “the ‘vast’ 
majority of programming”185 at home on a personal computer, instead 
emphasizing the software was tested using university equipment.186  The 
court also made no mention of the teacher exception.  
 
[45] These decisions, particularly Rouse, demonstrate the uphill battle 
that university faculty members face in attempts to defend individual 
ownership absent a teacher exception.  Whether by contract, university 
policy, or the seemingly inescapable precedent of CCNV, the scope of a 
professor’s employment includes the production of scholarly articles and 
teaching materials with unfortunate frequency.187  In other words, the job 
description of many a professor is to “publish or perish,” that is, to create 
copyrightable works.188   Under agency principles every work the 
professor creates and publishes is automatically a work made for hire, 
owned by the university.189  What makes the university-professor 
relationship different from the traditional master-servant relationship 
envisioned by agency law is the fact that the university so rarely dictates 
the content, the approach, or even the subject of potential works.  
                                                                                                                         
 
184 Id. at 1061. 
 
185 Id. at 1058. 
 
186 See Rouse, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60. 
 
187 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 1 
(2010-11 ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos066.htm (describing professors’ 
general duties “to do their own research” and to “publish their findings in scholarly 
journals, books, and electronic media”). 
 
188 Klein, supra note 25, at 166. 
 
189 See Packard, supra note 12, at 289.  
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Moreover, the professor expects to control his or her scholarly work as a 
matter of academic freedom, a principle that implicates both intellectual 
progress and freedom of expression.190 
 
V. A PROPOSED TWO-PRONGED TEST TO DELINEATE THE SCOPE OF 
THE TEACHER EXCEPTION 
 
[46] As litigation over the work-for-hire doctrine in academic settings 
increases in the coming years, courts that accept the continuing viability of 
the teacher exception will inevitably have to grapple with the exception’s 
scope.  While some courts may accept the exception wholeheartedly, as 
the Bosch court did,191 few would be so brazen as to suggest an across-the-
board exemption for teachers from the work-for-hire doctrine, no matter 
what type of works they create.  Moreover, if courts award to teachers a 
limited exemption from the general rule, then disputants will surely argue 
over who is a “teacher” and who is not.  Also, non-teachers will surely 
argue they are just as entitled to an exemption. 
 
[47] From a methodological standpoint, the dilemma faced by future 
courts is a classic one, that of a tension between statutory text and binding 
higher court precedent on the one hand, and countervailing policy 
considerations on the other.  In similar situations in other areas of law, the 
way a lower court decides depends largely on its philosophy regarding 
deference to prior legislative and judicial decision-making on the one 
hand, and the subjective weight the court assigns to the countervailing 
policies on the other.192  In this case, many particularly strong policy-
based arguments in favor of recognizing the teacher exception exist, as 
                                                 
190 See id. at 289-93 (discussing the connection between academic freedom and freedom 
of expression). 
 
191 See Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1719-21 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
 
192 See, e.g., id. (looking to prior legislative and judicial decision-making evidence in 
deciding whether the teacher exception applies).  
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articulated by prior courts and commentators.  What is more, the peculiar 
history of the work-for-hire doctrine and the teacher exception clouds the 
equation considerably.  The teacher exception does not represent a 
standard policy-based carve-out to a statutory rule since in this case the 
“carve-out” was established in the law before the statute ever existed.193  
There is simply no evidence whether Congress or the Supreme Court 
intended to override this particular aspect of the pre-existing common law.   
 
[48] This Part proposes a balanced and judicially manageable scope for 
the teacher exception.  Before continuing further, however, it is necessary 
to make two important notes.  First, this proposal assumes that the teacher 
exception does continue to exist in one form or another in the post-CCNV 
work-for-hire doctrine.  Bosch, and to a lesser extent Pavlica, prove that 
courts continue to recognize the teacher exception.194  This article aims to 
aid future courts that accept this reality but struggle to determine the scope 
of the exception.  It is not intended to weigh in over whether courts should 
recognize the teacher exception in the first place.  This author believes he 
has little new to offer in that well-worn debate. 
 
[49] Second, the proposed scope of the teacher exception is meant as a 
judicial solution, not as a legislative solution.  It seeks to balance policy 
considerations against deference to prior decisions made by Congress and 
the Supreme Court;195 Congress owes no such deference.  It is based in 
part on a desire to avoid wanton judicial policymaking and to respect the 
                                                 
193 See supra Part I. 
 
194 See Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720; Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524-
25 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  Contra Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 
F.3d 177, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the work-for-hire doctrine precluded the 
teacher’s ownership in tests and quizzes).  
 
195 See, e.g., Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718-21 (looking to both policy 
considerations and prior case law to make a determination on the applicability of the 
teacher exception). 
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constitutional division between the judicial and legislative branches of 
government.  Thus, ideal judicial and legislative solutions to the faculty 
work-for-hire problem do and should diverge.  However, this author 
believes that a legislative solution to the problem is unlikely to come about 
in the foreseeable future without either a judicial decision that has a near-
cataclysmic impact on professors or universities, or a complete overhaul 
of this country’s copyright regime.  In all likelihood, none of the lobbying 
groups representing the interests of professors, universities, K-12 teachers, 
or school administrators have both the political clout on Capitol Hill and 
the desire to disturb the peace between universities and their faculties in 
order to push through any legislation to deal with the issue. 
 
A. Prong One: the Type of the Work 
 
[50] Academic copyrightable works fall into three broad categories: (1) 
scholarly works; (2) course materials; and (3) administrative works.196  
Scholarly works are those works that the academic creates without direct 
supervision from his or her employer, during unscheduled time, for a 
primary purpose other than the teaching of specific courses offered to 
students by the university.197  Publication of a copyrightable work 
provides evidence that the work is scholarly in purpose, but is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to prove scholarly character.  Thus, research 
articles and opinion pieces are generally scholarly works, whether 
published or unpublished.  Course materials are works created primarily 
for the purpose of teaching specific courses offered to students by the 
                                                 
196 This article presents this categorization scheme purely as a heuristic tool in support of 
the analysis that follows.  It makes no claim that such a scheme is the only or the best 
way to categorize academic copyrightable works for other purposes. 
  
197 Cf. Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717 (defining “traditional academic 
copyrightable works” as all materials “created independently and at the creator’s 
initiative . . . not created as an institutional initiative”).   
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employer, such as most lectures, teaching notes and exams.198  
Administrative works comprise the catch-all category of all works that are 
neither scholarly works nor course materials: they include all of the 
academic’s works created under direct supervision or during employer-
scheduled time, but exclude all works created for the primary purpose of 
teaching specific courses offered by the university.199  Most works falling 
into this category would deal with university or departmental business. 
 
[51] Borderline cases under this system of categorization are important, 
but usually cases fall fairly neatly into one category or another.  Textbooks 
prepared for publication usually classify as scholarly works, since while 
their creators often test them in their own courses, their primary use is at 
other educational institutions.  Prepared lectures for a hypothetical course 
that a professor’s university does not offer to its students would also 
classify as scholarly works, while lectures prepared by one professor for a 
course taught by a colleague at the same university would classify as 
teaching materials.  Works related to teaching in general, but not to any 
specific course, such as materials for the development of curricula or 
grading schemes, would classify as administrative works.  Notably, from 
the perspective of copyright law, software code would not fit into one 
category or another as a whole.  The character of a piece of software 
would depend on the circumstances and purposes of its creation, just as 
with any other type of copyrightable work. 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186 (holding that tests, quizzes and homework problems 
created by the teacher were owned by the school – and not the teacher – under  the work-
for-hire doctrine because the materials were for an already established class, and thus 
under his scope of employment as a teacher). 
 
199 See, e.g., Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(“Perhaps the University forms a committee to study the appropriate use of small 
computers and conscripts professors as members. The committee may publish a report, in 
which the University will claim copyright.”).  Accordingly, because these works are 
“prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,” they fall under the 
work-for-hire exception.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).       
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[52] The teacher exception should apply to scholarly works, but not to 
course materials or administrative works.  The reason for this is 
straightforward: the truly compelling justifications for the teacher 
exception apply most strongly to scholarly works, and less strongly to 
other categories.  Judge Posner articulated the reasoning most succinctly: a 
declaration of ownership of scholarly works in universities, rather than in 
professors, would be fundamentally at odds with the "conditions of 
academic production" and would "wreak [havoc] in the settled practices of 
academic institutions. . . ."200  Intellectual workers in the academic world 
often need the creative freedom and control associated with ownership in 
order to do their work.  Lack of freedom and control not only would 
potentially stifle professors’ creativity, but would discourage them from 
joining the academy in the first place.  The campus culture, the cradle of 
modern innovation in the sciences and the arts, would be fundamentally 
threatened.  Moreover, professors' assignments of their copyrights to third 
parties would in many cases be invalidated, causing massive disruptions in 
the industries that depend heavily on those assignments, such as 
publishing and computer software.  For example, if copyright assignees in 
those industries made their agreements with the professors rather than with 
their universities, a declaration of university authorship might seriously 
jeopardize the rights of a publisher that made a book deal with an 
Economics professor, or of a dot-com that purchased software code from a 
Computer Science professor.  The downstream economic effects of such a 
widespread loss of the perceived property and contractual rights could be 
catastrophic. 
 
[53] In contrast, university control over course materials and 
administrative works would not have nearly such widespread or negative 
effects.  Professors prepare lectures, syllabi, and exam materials for 
purposes internal to their universities, not external.  The property and 
contractual rights affected by the ownership of the works are those of the 
professor and the university, and rarely have significant downstream 
                                                 
200 Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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effects.201  Moreover, the justifications for the work-for-hire doctrine 
apply in stronger force to course materials and administrative works than 
to scholarly works.  While universities have a legitimate business interest 
in enhancing their reputations through the scholarly work of their 
faculties,202 they have an even stronger interest, buttressed by both 
reputation and contractual duty, in maintaining their business operations, 
controlling their curricula, and ensuring that each student receives a 
quality education. 
 
[54] The Williams court supported its application of the teacher 
exception to lecture notes by arguing, in part, that “[p]rofessors are a 
peripatetic lot, moving from campus to campus,” and that they need to 
keep ownership of their course materials in order to develop them for 
future courses at other institutions.203  Even if tenured professors do move 
around more than the typical non-academic creative employee – a bold 
assumption in today’s mobile job marketplace – the need of professors to 
keep control of their course materials does not seem so compelling as to 
justify a departure from statutory work-for-hire doctrine.  Universities 
have as much of a right to control the evolution of teaching materials as 
professors, if not more so.  The value of a professorial candidate to a 
university lies in her credentials, reputation, teaching ability, and ability to 
attract research funding; it should not be the intellectual property that she 
carries with her.   
 
[55] If course materials belong to universities, rather than to professors, 
then what recourse do the professors have to develop their lectures freely 
                                                 
201 Under the Copyright Act, works within the academic setting are either owned by the 
professor, or by the university.  17 U.S.C. § 201(a) § 201(b).   
 
202 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that 
university funding and sanctioning of research projects serves “to increase the status of 
the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty”). 
 
203 Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
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and independently from university control?  In fact, professors have 
several tools at their disposal to retain use rights to their teaching 
materials.  Under the categories of academic works described earlier, 
textbooks, lectures, and other teaching materials not created primarily for 
specific university courses would be considered scholarly in nature and 
would therefore fall under the teacher exception.204  Courts might also 
hold, similarly to Bosch, that professors may use course materials they 
create on behalf of their universities under the fair use doctrine.205  
Additionally, professors may gain the right to use course materials or to 
create derivative works from them under the theory of implied license.206   
 
[56] Of course, professors may also gain full ownership by contract or 
by university policy.  Nevertheless, contracts and policies cannot vest 
authorship in the professor, rather than in the university, for the purpose of 
termination rights.207  Yet termination rights are largely irrelevant for 
course materials, since course materials are rarely assigned to third parties 
and are generally of little value thirty-five years after their creation.  
 
B. Prong Two: The Position of the Creator 
 
[57] The second issue when determining the scope of the teacher 
exception is to whom it should apply.  At first blush, it might seem 
obvious that a "teacher" exception should apply to all teachers, and only to 
teachers.  However, commentators, rather than courts, apparently coined 
                                                 
204 See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text. 
  
205 See, e.g., Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1722 (C.D. Ill. 2006).  
 
206 See Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright 
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 275 (2009) (proposing an 
expansion of the implied license doctrine “to impose norms based on public policy 
considerations in order to bring reasonableness into the law of copyright . . . ”).  
 
207 See Wadley & Brown, supra note 123, at 424-25. 
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the term "teacher exception" as a simple nametag to describe an 
underdeveloped rule of law.  Williams, the case that explicitly established 
the "teacher exception," made no reference to that term, referring only to 
"university lectures."208  Because so few published opinions exist in the 
faculty work-for-hire arena, determining to whom the exception should 
apply necessarily falls back on who needs it the most. 
 
[58] The teacher exception should apply to all academic creators whose 
positions grant them a traditional expectation of ownership in the scholarly 
works they create.  While this test might seem vague or unwieldy, its 
application is surprisingly straightforward in the vast majority of real-
world cases.  As discussed throughout the case law and commentary, 
professors and the colleges and universities that employ them have 
traditionally and near-universally assumed that the professors own the 
scholarly works they create.209  Thus, professors have a traditional 
expectation of ownership.  There is no evidence of a comparable tradition 
for K-12 teachers and their schools, so the teacher exception would not 
apply to K-12 teachers.  Other categories of academic employees fall 
neatly into this dichotomy.  There are few borderline cases. 
 
 
1. K-12 Teachers 
 
[59] The most obvious effect of a “traditional expectation of 
ownership” test excludes K-12 teachers.  Unlike their higher-education 
counterparts, the work-for-hire doctrine should include primary and 
secondary school faculty for two broad reasons.  First, the arguments 
                                                 
208 See Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546. 
 
209 See, e.g., Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987); Bosch, 
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719-20; Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational 
Process: The Right of Teacher Inception, 75 IOWA L. REV. 381-395 (1990) (“The 
Williams court appears to have recognized [the] academic tradition, which . . . assumed 
that professors owned the copyrights to their works . . . .”).  
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supporting the teacher exception simply apply with little force, if any, in 
the K-12 arena.  As the Second Circuit noted in Shaul, there is no 
academic tradition granting control of creative works to K-12 teachers.210  
Lower-education schools usually assign to their teachers the task of 
developing course materials based on curricula dictated by school districts.  
K-12 teachers rarely bear any duty to create scholarly works outside of the 
classroom context.  As with the type-of-work analysis, courts should not 
depart from unambiguous statutory language and Supreme Court decree 
except in the most compelling of cases.  The K-12 setting is not one of 
those cases. 
 
[60] Second, the teacher exception should exclude K-12 teachers as 
they generally do not need it in the first place.  K-12 teachers’ interests in 
the scholarly works they create are usually adequately protected by agency 
law’s “scope of employment” rules.211  This principle is borne out by 
Pavlica, where the court aligned with Hays in acknowledging that the 
plaintiff, a high school teacher, could have ownership of a teaching 
manual he wrote without any involvement from his school.212  While a 
survey of primary and secondary school teachers might indicate a 
widespread belief that they own the materials they write for their schools, 
there is no apparent reason why they would hold that belief more strongly 
than members of non-teaching professions.  More importantly, K-12 
teachers have not traditionally relied on an assumption of ownership to 
create a vast network of property and contractual rights, as have their 
counterparts on the university campus. 
 
 
                                                 
210 See Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 
211 See id. at 186; Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
 
212 See Pavlica, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
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2. Non-teaching University Faculty, Students, and  
Other Academics 
 
[61] Under the proposed “traditional expectation” test, the "teacher" 
exception would expand to include many types of employees on the 
university campus aside from teachers.  Many universities employ non-
teaching faculty and postdoctoral fellows.  Some universities allow their 
professors to “buy out” their teaching responsibilities if they bring in 
sufficient research funding from external sources.213  Many research 
professors and postdoctoral fellows have as their sole duty the 
responsibility to “publish or perish,” that is, to conduct research and create 
written works for publication.214  Universities also employ students, both 
at the graduate and undergraduate level; those students often contribute to 
scholarly articles written by their faculty advisors.  Some of them even 
write articles of their own within the scope of their employment duties.  
To exclude non-teaching faculty, postdoctoral fellows, students, and other 
such academics from the teacher exception would defy common sense and 
the policies upon which the teacher exception is based.  There is no less of 
an academic tradition granting ownership of creative works to these types 
of positions than to teaching faculty.  Moreover, academic freedom does 
not stop at the classroom door; all academic researchers and commentators 
need the same leeway to publish and to communicate free from university 
control.  A professor who buys out her teaching duties should not 
unwittingly lose her right to control the articles or textbooks she writes. 
 
[62] The extension of the teacher exception to non-teaching faculty 
would have flipped the ownership of the cattle-imaging software in Rouse 
                                                 
213 See, e.g., BOSTON COLLEGE, PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT FACULTY HANDBOOK 19-21 
(2011), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/psych/pdf/ 
faculty_ handbook.pdf; WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY 
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT OF ACADEMIC YEAR RESEARCH 
SALARY 1 (2011), available at http://www.wfu.edu/rsp/pdf/acadyrsalary1-31-11.pdf. 
 
214 See Klein, supra note 25, at 166. 
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to the professors.215  That would have been the proper result in that case 
because it may have enabled the plaintiffs to keep some control of the 
software and prevented the software’s use by one of the defendants, a 
private consultant, without the plaintiffs’ consent.  There is no principled 
reason why the research professors’ control over their software should 
have turned on whether they had held any teaching responsibilities on the 
side.  Indeed, in light of this, the “teacher exception” should properly be 
renamed the “academic exception,” as it is already called in a handful of 
court decisions and commentaries.216  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
 
[63] This article has aimed to advance discussion about academic work-
for-hire issues in light of a new generation of court decisions in the new 
millennium.  These decisions have debunked the previous conventional 
wisdom that the teacher exception to the work-for-hire doctrine was 
effectively dead.  The advent of termination rights and changes in 
technology, distance education, and university economics will lead to 
increasing litigation on the issue, and courts must consider not only 
whether the teacher exception should continue to exist, but in what form 
and scope.  This article’s proposal for a two-part test for the exception 
aims to balance the binding force of statutory law and Supreme Court 
precedent against the compelling policies under which courts originally 
                                                 
215 See Rouse v. Walter & Assocs., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1065 (S.D. Iowa 2007) 
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430-31. 
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established the exception.  It recognizes that, based on those compelling 
policies, the so-called “teacher” exception should properly be called an 
academic exception and should apply to scholarly works, but not to course 
materials or administrative works.  Furthermore, it should apply to 
teachers, as well as to non-teaching academics, including university 
researchers and graduate students.  This realignment of the exception 
could open up a whole new world of possibilities for people in these 
positions and advance the interests of academic freedom and scholarly 
innovation.  
